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Abstract 
This study offers new insights by employing Indonesian data. The uniqueness of 
Indonesian companies is reflected by the common occurrence of ownership 
concentration among a few large families and affiliation with a corporate group in 
which seems nonexistent in many developed countries. With regard to the 
methodology problem, this study uses simultaneous equations model to overcome the 
endogeneity problem in debt-equity study. It is reported that the external block 
ownership has dominant position by having majority control and impact on powerless 
Indonesian managers. The inadequate legal framework for investors' protection, 
insufficient internal financing and improper development of the capital market occur. 
With regard to this situation, debt-equity chQice was widely practiced. There is 
evidence that Indonesian companies relied heavily on loans to finance unrealistic 
rapid corporate expansion. The insignificant relationship between the level of debt 
and tangibility of assets and profitability indicate the appearance of moral hazard 
problem before the crisis. This study points out that the dominant external block 
ownership can have a detrimental effect on the shareholders and debtholders relation. 
It induces the higher cost of debt which is typically described in forms of asset 
substitution or risk shifting problem. As a result, severe agency conflict occurs is not 
between shareholders and managers as often assumed in the previous studies but 
between shareholders and debtholders. 
xvi 
Analisis Empirikal Tentang Piliban Hutang-Ekuiti Bagi Syarikat-Syarikat di 
Indonesia 
Abstrak 
Kajian ini menyumbangkan pengetahuan yang baru dengan menggunakan data dari 
Indonesia. Khususnya, pilihan di antara hutang dan ekuiti oleh firma Indonesia 
berbeza daripada negara maju. Ini terbukti di dalam konsentrasi pemilikan di antara 
beberapa keluarga terpengaruh dan perhubungan di an tara sesuatu kumpulan syarikat 
yang tidak berlaku di negara maju. Berhubung dengan masalah metodologi, kajian ini 
menggunakan model persamaan serentak untuk mengatasi masalah endogeneiti yang 
timbul di dalam setengah kajian ke atas hutang-ekuiti yang lepas. Ia dilaporkan 
bahawa pemilikan luaran secara blok mempunyai kedudukan yang dominan secara 
. 
kawalan majority dan ini mempengaruhi pengurus Indonesia supaya menjadi tidak 
berwibawa. Undang-undang yang tidak lengkap bagi mempertahankan hak pelabur, 
kekurangan kewangan dalaman dan pasaran saham yang mentah juga berlaku. 
Berhubung dengan keadaan ini, pilihan hutang-ekuiti diamalkan. Terdapat bukti 
bahawa syarikat di Indonesia bergantung kuat ke atas pinjaman untuk membiayai 
perkembangan corporate pesat dan tidak realistik. Perhubungan yang tidak signifikan 
di antara tahap hutang dan ketaraan aset dan pendapatan membuktikan kemunculan 
masalah "moral hazard'. Kajian ini membuktikan bahawa pemilikan luaran secara 
blok boleh mempunyai kesan negative ke atas perhubungan' di antara pemegang 
saham dan pemberi hutang. Ia mengakibatkan kos hutang yang lebih tinggi yang 
sering disebutkan di dalam bentuk masalah penggantian asset atau pemindahan risiko. 
Oleh sebab ini, masalah agensi yang serius di Indonesia berlaku bukan di an tara 
pemegang saham dan pengurus seperti yang diandaikan di negara yang rnaju tetapi di 
dalam bentuk di antara pemegang saham dan pemberi hutang. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Debt-equity choice is one of the most important decisions in financing policy. The 
impact of a faulty financing decision on a company could be disastrous as was 
experienced by many South East Asian companies in the 1997 financial crisis. Many 
companies were on the verge of collapsing when the economy changed overnight 
during the crisis (Kim & Mark, 1999). There is an interesting financial phenomenon 
in Indonesian companies with respect to debt-equity choice as reflected by the high 
level of debt and high ownership concentration. 
A number of previous studies on debt-equity. choice have assumed firm debt as 
an endogenous variable which in turn is determined by several exogenous variables 
(e.g. Homaifar, Zietz, & Benkato, 1994; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 
1988). A majority of empirical studies employ a model in which the level of debt is 
regressed on a list of explanatory variables by assuming that Fd = !(Xi), where: Fd is 
a measurement of firm debt, and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables (Prasad, 
Green, & Murinde, 2001). 
Prior studies also argued that ownership structure is a function of the level of 
debt and other firm's variables. These two variables, namely the level of debt, firm 
performance and the ownership structure were used interchangeably as a dependent 
and an independent variable (Setiawan & Taib, 2002b). This is known as endogeneity 
problem or jointly determined problem under the econometric point of view (Greene, 
2000; Gujarati, 2003). 
Studies on capital structure have made great contributions in understanding the 
behaviour of firms with respect to their choice among the use of debt or equity. 
Despite the merits, debt-equity study should be understood critically on the real issues 
in developing countries namely Indonesian companies which are suffering from high 
level of debt and ownership concentration. It should also address to the relevant 
econometric viewpoint such as endogeneity problem. 
1.1.1 Financial Phenomenon of Indonesian Companies 
Most Indonesian public listed companies (henceforth Indonesian companies) have 
been substantially financed by credit. As shown in Table 1.1, the debt-equity ratio 
increased from 240.0 in 1993 to 310.0 in 1997 (Husnan, 2001). It indicates that the 
higher debt correlate with the lower return on assets. Similar findings were reported in 
other studies by Claessens, Djankov, and Nenova (2000a), Zhuang, Edwards, Webb, 
and Capulong (2000). 
Table 1.1 
Debt to Equity and Firm Performance of Indonesian Companies, 1993 - 1997 
(percent) 
Indicators 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Debt-to-Equity 240.0 220.0 220.0 230.0 310.0 
Return on Equity 12.5 12.0 11.3 10.7 1.1 
Return on Assets 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.2 0.6 
Source: Husnan (2001). 
Concerning ownership structure, empirical evidence show that Indonesian 
companies are characterised by high ownership concentration as reflected by Table 
1.2. Other studies which employed Indonesian data also reported similar finding 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 1999a; La Porta, Silanes & Shleifer, 1998a; Taridi, 
1999; Zhuang et aI., 2000). High ownership concentration has been regarded as one of 
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the factors that lead to excessive borrowing behaviour. This In tum can affect 
companies' performance negatively (Supratikno, 2000). 
A few previous studies of Indonesian companies for examples, Husnan (2001) 
and Taridi (1999) have investigated corporate governance issues in Indonesia. These 
studies indicate that Indonesian companies were suffering from high level of debt and 
ownership concentration. However, the possibilities of the existence of moral hazard 
problem in debt-equity choice were not examined in tliese studies. Furthermore, prior 
studies only provided descriptive explanation with respect to the association between 
ownership structure and moral hazard problems (Kwik, 1994, 1996; Wibisono, 1998). 
Table 1.2 
Ownership Concentration of Indonesian Companies, 1993 - 1997 (percent) 
Shareholder Rank 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Average 
Largest 50.5 48.1 47.9 48.5 48.2 48.6 
Second Largest 16.6 13.7 14.1 12.0 11.6 13.6 
Third Largest 3.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.4 3.9 
Fourth Largest 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.0 
Fifth Largest 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 0.8 
Total 72.7 68.3 68.7 67.5 67.5 68.9 
Source: Husnan (2001). 
These financial phenomenons can be explained using agency theory due to the 
problem may originate from the powerless managers in determining debt and equity 
to finance the investment. Regarding risk aversion assumption (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), when ownership concentration gets bigger, it is possible that moral hazard 
behaviour occurs with shareholders shifting their risks to debtholders. 
It is widely accepted that debt-equity choice is related to ownership structure 
(Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua, 1999; Chen & Steiner, 1999; Cho, 1998; Xu & Wang, 
3 
1997). To date, there has been no study looking at the relationship between debt-
equity choice and ownership structure, and how it affects the moral hazard problem of 
Indonesian companies. Therefore, this study is going to investigate the 
interdependency among debt-equity choice, ownership structure and firm 
performance. Apart from highlighting how Indonesian companies choose debt or 
equity in financing their investment, it also intends to provide further enlightenment 
in relation to financial behaviour, namely moral hazard problem. 
1.1.2 Methodology Issues 
Generally, debt-equity study is associated with three constructs i.e. the level of firm 
debt itself, ownership structure, and firm performance. However, previous studies 
basically take the relationships among these constructs in isolation. Jensen and Smith 
(1985), and Jensen and Warner (1988) conducted prior work that paid attention to the 
links between ownership structure and control. 
A study which discussed the link between corporate strategy and capital 
structure is conducted by Barton and Gordon (1988). Prasad, Bruton and Merikas 
(1997) examined long-run strategic capital structure and argued that if capital 
structure can be identified, a firm could maximize its value by reaching and 
maintaining its financial mix. Meanwhile, Kochhar (1997) studied the relationship 
among strategic assets, capital structure, and firm performance. 
Brailsford et al. (1999) focused on the link between ownership structure and 
debt-equity choice. Ang, Rebel and James (2000), de Jong (1999, 2000) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) conducted the study which concentrated on the relationship 
between debt-equity choice and the agency problem. 
4 
There are several notable studies on the determinant of debt-equity choice 
such as Banerjee, Hesmati, and Wihlborg (1999); Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997), 
Homaifar et al. (1994) and Kester (1986). Studies on the link between investor 
protection, ownership concentration and the level of debt were conducted by La Porta, 
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998a). 
Generally, previous studies used a straightforward regression in analyzing 
determinants of debt-equity choice. Firm debt is normally assumed to be a dependent 
variable in most studies, some examples of studies are those of Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987); Brailsford et al. (1999); Friend and Lang (1988); Kim and 
Sorensen (1986); McConnell and Servaes (1995); Moh'd, Perry, and Rimbey (1998); 
Rajan and Zinga\es (1995); Titman and Wessels (1988). 
A few studies have argued that ownership structure is a function of the level of 
debt and other firm's variables (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morek, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1988). In other words, the level of firm debt has been used interchangeably 
either as a dependent or an independent variable in previous studies. 
Hence, there is a good reason to believe that if the level of firm debt, the 
ownership structure, as well as the firm performance have been jointly determined, it 
is necessary to look at these variables simultaneously. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Indonesia is a developing country with high use of debt and is among the highest 
ownership concentration in the world (Zhuang et aI, 2000). It is interesting to see how 
these uniques feature of Indonesian market influence the companies' choice of debt 
and equity: 
1. How do Indonesian companies finance their investment? 
5 
2. Which block of ownership has prominent role in debt-equity choice? What agency 
problem might occur in relation to the role of the dominant block in debt-equity? 
3. What is the nature of the link between ownership structure and control related to 
debt-equity choice? 
4 How do ownership structure and the level of firm debt have an impact on firm 
performance? 
1.3 Objective of the Study 
This study tries to examine the Indonesian financial phenomenon particularly 
In debt-equity choice such as: (i) whether the debt-equity choice is related to 
ownership structure. The ownership of the Indonesian companies was concentrated 
among a few large families as opposed to companies in developed countries where 
ownership structure is more dispersed; (ii) whether the affiliation with a corporate 
group has impact to debt-equity choice. The affiliation with a corporate group which 
widely practised in Indonesian companies, as for this phenomenon does not existing 
in many developed countries (see also Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000c). 
1.4 Contributions of the Study 
Building on well-known capital structure theories and principal agency model, this 
study attempts to provide some contributions to this field by comparing the findings 
before, during the crisis, and in the overall period. It also provides new insights by 
paying attention to the curvilinear relationship among firm debt, ownership structure, 
and firm performance in an integrated link. 
The application of agency theory will give clear explanations about moral 
hazard problem which might occur related to how firms in Indonesia prefer debt or 
6 
equity to finance their investment. Specifically, these contributions are taken in the 
form of: 
1. Documenting descriptively financial pattern, ownership concentration and 
ownership composition of Indonesian companies, and examine it by 
presenting the type of control and monitoring of Indonesian companies. With 
regard to ownership concentration, this study has two proxies, namely the 
largest external block ownership shareholder (henceforth the largest 
shareholder) and the top five external block ownership shareholders 
(henceforth top five shareholders). 
2. It offers new evidence of moral hazard behaviour when there are sufficient 
condition for the problem to occur for instance, high ownership concentration 
and insufficient legal framework for investors' protection. It contributs in the 
following ways: 
2.1. Examining the debt-equity choice of Indonesian companies before and 
during the crisis. 
2.2. This study would seek answer as to why Indonesian companies prefer 
debt to equity. 
2.3. This study re-examines debt-equity choice where high ownership 
concentration occurred. 
2.4. This study re-examines the agency problem encountered by Indonesian 
companies. 
3. Contributing methodologically by using simultaneous mUltiple equations. 
Besides having its advantages, it offers a series of tests provide method which 
has adequate result. 
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